A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted
Informational Environment
May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satis…es four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satis…es May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote from each voter, then plurality rule is the uniquely compelling electoral procedure. To illustrate the conditional nature of this claim, we also identify a richer informational environment in which approval voting, not plurality rule, is supported by a May-style argument.
Social choice theorists in Condorcet's and Borda's tradition are idealistic electoral reformers in at least two respects. First, they propose certain ideals on what information we should collect from voters in a balloting procedure. Second, they propose certain ideals on how we should aggregate that information in an aggregation procedure, so as to make a decision on its basis. A full voting procedure consists of both a balloting procedure and an aggregation procedure. 2 In this article, we want to be only half as idealistic. Here we take balloting procedures as they are, and consider aggregation procedures as they might be. We o¤er a 2 The same balloting procedure can go along with di¤erent aggregation procedures (e.g., fullpreference balloting with pairwise majority voting, STV, AV, the Borda count etc.) and the same aggregation procedure with di¤erent balloting procedures (e.g., plurality rule with secret single-vote balloting, open single-vote balloting, and even full-preference balloting). Many works in social choice theory presuppose, either explicitly or implicitly, full-preference balloting, as discussed in more detail below.
conditional defense of "plurality rule."If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote from each voter, then plurality rule, which always chooses the option with the most votes, is the uniquely compelling aggregation procedure; it is so, in the sense that it uniquely satis…es May's well-known minimal conditions on a democratic procedure generalized to decisions over any number of options. 3 Our result thus constitutes a many-option generalization of May's (1952) classical theorem on majority rule in the distinctive, but politically common, informational environment of singlevote balloting. May's conditions are widely regarded as normatively compelling in the two-option case, for which they were originally formulated, and we suggest that they remain compelling in the many-option case considered here. 4 Our result should be of interest in at least two respects. First, to the best of our knowledge, plurality rule has never been associated with May's theorem or a many-option version of May's conditions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, plurality rule has traditionally been held in low esteem, among both formal social choice theorists and philosophical theorists of democracy. To emphasize, we do not unconditionally defend plurality rule. In particular, we do not defend single-vote balloting procedures; we only make a conditional claim: If single-vote balloting is used -as it often is, in practice -then plurality rule is the way to go.
Of course, collecting only a single vote from each voter is not ideal. For example, "the number of voters who think each candidate the worst ... is no less important ... than the number of voters who think each candidate the best" (Dummett, 1997, 51-52) . A balloting procedure that collects voters'revealed "…rst choices"alone takes no account of that. It would undeniably be ideal in many cases to collect voters'full preferences, top to bottom, over all available options. It would at least be an improvement to collect more (even short of "full") information about these preferences, through a two-ballot runo¤ procedure, such as in France, for example. Such richer 5 Vulnerability to strategic voting is not unique to plurality rule, but shared by all reasonable aggregation procedures over more than two options, which are typically not strategy-proof (by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem). But under plurality rule, strategic voting is limited as follows:
voters have an incentive to vote for their preferred option among those two options that they think are most likely to win. In particular, plurality rule has the property of being "immune to insincere manipulation" (van Hees and Dowding, 2005 Fishburn (1978, 1983) . Our …ndings highlight that the question about the most compelling aggregation procedure depends on the informational environment in which the procedure is meant to operate. Finally, we make some concluding remarks.
1 May' s theorem May's (1952) classical theorem states that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule, uniquely among all aggregation procedures, satis…es the four normatively appealing conditions of being: open to all inputs ("universal domain");
not biased in favor of any particular voter ("anonymity"); not biased in favor of any particular option ("neutrality"); and "positively responsive"to people's votes (if one or more voters change their votes in favor of one option and no others change theirs, then the social decision does not change in the opposite direction; and if the outcome was a tie before the change, then the tie is broken in the direction of the change).
In both formal social choice theory and democratic theory more generally, this result occupies a prominent place as an argument for democratic rule, in the form of simple majority rule.
In the formal social choice literature, May's theorem "is deservedly considered a minor classic" (Barry and Hardin, 1982, 298) . It is one of the …rst things said on the subject of "normative properties of social decision rules", in all the classic overviews, beginning with Luce and Rai¤a's Games and Decisions (1957, 357-358) and running through Mueller's Public Choice III (2003, 133-136 (1970, 68, and extends it in a paper with Pattanaik (Sen and Pattanaik, 1969) .
Several other social choice theorists o¤er derivations and extensions (e.g., Murakami, 1966 Murakami, , 1968 Pattanaik, 1971, 50-52; Fishburn, 1973, 50, 57 ¤.; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997, 160-162; Dasgupta and Maskin, 1998; Cantillon and Rangel, 2002) .
Because its proof is relatively straightforward, May's theorem may count only as a "minor" classic in formal social choice theory, but it has been received as a major …nding in democratic theory more generally. In a …eld replete with negative …ndings (impossibility, instability and manipulability results), 8 May's theorem stands out as a powerful positive result supporting democratic rule.
Consider these examples, to get a sense of how deeply May's theorem has penetrated non-formal democratic theory. In Democracy and Its Critics, the capstone of Robert Dahl's lifelong work on democratic theory, May's theorem is invoked as the second of his "four justi…cations for majority rule" (Dahl, 1989, 139-141 (1980, (277) (278) (279) (280) (281) (282) (283) (284) (285) .
It is a key element in "political equality" as conceptualized by both Beitz (1989, 59) and Christiano (1990, 154-157; 1993, 183; , and continual reference is made to it 8 The most prominent negative results are Arrow's theorem (1951 Arrow's theorem ( /1963 and results about cyclical social preferences and electoral disequilibrium (Sen, 1970 (Sen, , 1977 Scho…eld, 1976; McKelvey, 1979; cf. Mackie, 2003) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on strategic manipulability (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) . For an overview, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) .
across democratic theory (Coleman and Ferejohn, 1986, 18-19; Martin, 1993, 367-368 n. 5; Saward, 1998, 69; Waldron, 1999, 148, 189 n. 38; Risse, 2004, 51-5) .
In its original (1952) form, however, May's theorem applies only to decisions between two options. This restriction is occasionally noted in the democratic theory literature, but rarely pursued. For example, Coleman and Ferejohn (1996, 18) Dasgupta and Maskin, 1998) . But it may fail to produce a transitive social preference ordering -the problem of majority cycling -and if pairwise majority votes are taken sequentially, their outcome may depend on the order in which votes are taken and may thus be vulnerable to strategic agenda setting (e.g., Riker, 1982) . Even setting these problems aside, in the real world our decisions often do not have this pairwise format; pairwise majority voting requires a richer informational environment than we are often in politically, namely full-preference balloting.
Curiously, in the formal social choice literature, May's theorem has never been extended beyond decisions in a pairwise format. 9 Here we extend May's theorem to non-pairwise decisions over many options, where voters each cast a vote for one option or abstain. Our conditions are straightforward generalizations of May's original ones.
We prove that -perhaps surprisingly, given its bad reputation -plurality rule uniquely satis…es those conditions. Although there are other axiomatic characterizations of plurality rule in the literature (e.g., Richelson, 1978; Roberts, 1991; Ching, 1996) , we are not aware of any contribution -formal or informal -that associates May's theorem, or a many-option version of May's precise conditions, with plurality rule.
2 An informal statement of the result :::
, where each x j is either 0 or 1 and at least one x j is 1. For each j, we write f (v) j = x j . Informally, f (v) j = 1 means that option j is winning or Informally, if a pro…le changes from w to v, then v j w means that at least one individual's vote changes towards option j from some other option h, while all other votes remain the same.
1 0 And v il = w il for all options l 6 = j; h. Under single-vote balloting, this clause is already implied by vij > wij and v ih < w ih . However, in the alternative environment of approval balloting discussed below, we need to add this clause explicitly.
Positive responsiveness. For any two pro…les v and w and any j, if f (w) j = 1 and v j w, then f (w) j = 1 and, for all h 6 = j, f (w) h = 0.
If k = 2, these conditions reduce to the standard conditions of May's theorem.
De…ne plurality rule as the aggregation procedure f , where, for any pro…le v and any option j,
v ih for all h 6 = j; 0 otherwise.
We can now formally prove our result.
Theorem 1 (restated). An aggregation procedure satis…es universal domain, anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness if and only if it is plurality rule.
Clearly, plurality rule satis…es all the conditions. It satis…es universal domain because it is de…ned for all logically possible pro…les. It satis…es anonymity because its winner (or tied set of options) depends only on the number of votes for each option, not on the voters'identities. It satis…es neutrality because the question of whether an option is winning, tied or losing depends only on the number of votes for this option and its contenders, not on these options' labels. It satis…es positive responsiveness because any additional votes for a winning option do not hurt that option, and any additional votes for a tied option break the tie in favor of that option.
Suppose, conversely, that an aggregation procedure f satis…es all the conditions.
For any pro…le v, we call the column vector a = :::
where a 1 ( 0) is the number of votes for option 1, a 2 ( 0) the number of votes for option 2, and so on, and a 1 + : : : + a k n. By anonymity of f , if two pro…les v and w are such that
w). This implies:
Claim 1. The aggregation procedure f can be represented by a function g whose domain is the set of all possible votes vectors and whose co-domain is the same as
The neutrality of f implies:
Claim 2. For any votes vector a and any row permutation , g( (a)) = (g(a)). To complete the proof that f is plurality rule, we need to show that, for each votes vector a, g(a) j = 1 if and only if a j a h for all h 6 = j. First, take any votes vector a with g(a) j = 1. Assume, for contradiction, that a j < a h for some h 6 = j. Let be the row permutation that swaps rows j and h and leaves all other rows …xed.
By claim 2, g( (a)) = (g(a)) and thus g( (a)) h = (g(a)) h = g(a) j = 1. We have (a) j a because (a) j = a h = a j + e and (a) h = a j = a h e for some e > 0, and (a) l = a l for all l 6 = j; h. So, by claim 3, g( (a)) j = 1 and, for all l 6 = j, g( (a)) l = 0, which contradicts g( (a)) h = 1.
Conversely, take any votes vector a with a j a h for all h 6 = j. Assume, for contradiction, that g(a) j = 0. As g has the same co-domain as f , there is some h 6 = j such that g(a) h = 1. Let be the same row permutation as before. By claim 2, g( (a)) = (g(a)) and thus g( (a)) h = (g(a)) h = g(a) j = 0. Either a j = a h or a j > a h . If a j = a h , then (a) = a and thus g(a) h = g( (a)) h = 0, a contradiction.
If a j > a h , we have (a) h a because (a) h = a j = a h + e and (a) j = a h = a j e
for some e > 0, and (a) l = a l for all l 6 = j; h. So, by claim 3, g( (a)) h = 1, a contradiction.
The informational environment of voting
We have generalized A side e¤ect of this restricted informational environment is that the notorious problem of cyclical majority preferences remains hidden here. Given a set of revealed "…rst-choice" votes, plurality rule always produces a determinate winning option (or a tied set of options); no cycle can be observed. Nonetheless, in terms of voters'
underlying full preferences, there may well be majority cycles. Single-vote balloting does not solve -it merely hides -the problems raised by standard social choice paradoxes. 11
Notice that many standard critiques of plurality rule do not actually undermine 1 1 But, arguably, many prominent responses to these paradoxes, such as Shepsle and Weingast's (1981) structure-induced equilibrium, also only hide these problems. Although we de…ne plurality rule in a restricted informational environment, where a vector of single votes is aggregated into a winning option or tied set, it can also be de…ned in a richer environment, where a vector of preference orderings is aggregated into one of the following outputs: (i) a social preference ordering (Arrow's framework), (ii) a choice function that assigns to each set of available options a winning option or tied set (the "collective choice rule" framework), (iii) a single winning option (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite framework). Then Arrow's theorem applies in cases (i) and (ii) (suitably reformulated in (ii)), and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem applies in case (iii). Hence plurality rule, suitably de…ned, violates some of Arrow's conditions (i.e. IIA and Pareto) and some of Gibbard's and Satterthwaite's (i.e.
strategy-proofness). But Arrow's and Gibbard's and Satterthwaite's theorems cannot be formulated in the present restricted informational environment, as conditions such as contraction or expansion consistency, IIA, strategy-proofness etc. are not expressible here. Thus the problems raised by these theorems remain "hidden" in that environment, although they occur in a richer environment into which the restricted one can be embedded.
our conditional claim -that plurality rule should be used as an aggregation procedure if a single-vote balloting procedure is used -but they are rather directed against the antecedent of this conditional, i.e. they criticize the use of single-vote balloting procedures. (And, as we have noted, we do not defend single-vote balloting here.) Recall Dummett's above quoted point that "the number of voters who think each candidate the worst ... is no less important ... than the number of voters who think each candidate the best" (see further Dummett, 1984, ch. 6; 1997, 51-57) . Borda (1784 Borda ( /1995 begins his critique of plurality rule as follows:
There is a widespread feeling, which I have never heard disputed, that in a ballot vote, the plurality of votes always shows the will of the voters.
That is, that the candidate who obtains this plurality is necessarily preferred by the voters to his opponents. But I shall demonstrate that this feeling, while correct when the election is between just two candidates, can lead to error in all other cases.
In elaboration, Borda focuses on the balloting procedure underlying plurality rule:
"If a form of election is to be just, the voters must be able to rank each candidate according to his merits, compared successively to the merits of each of the others..."
Plurality rule "is highly unsatisfactory"in those terms, precisely "because in this type of election, the voters cannot give a su¢ ciently complete account of their opinions of the candidates...".
Fishburn illustrates how single-vote balloting can fail to record important information. Consider a 100-person electorate with preferences (best to worst) over options
x, y and z as follows: 34 voters have x y z; 33 have y z x; 33 have z y x.
As Fishburn (1973, 162) observes, "Plurality selects x. ... [But] x has 34 …rst-place votes and 66 third-place votes, whereas y has 33 …rst-place votes, 57 second-place votes and no third-place votes. Also, options y and z are each preferred to option x by a majority of 66 out of 100 voters. Plurality rule decides outcomes on the basis of …rst-preferences alone. If second-and third-preferences are to count for anything much at all, then surely there should be a strong case for option y being socially chosen rather than x."
In short, standard critiques of plurality rule are in fact critiques of single-vote balloting; they do not undermine the conditional claim we defend here.
From single-vote balloting to approval balloting
To further emphasize the conditional nature of our argument for plurality rule, we …nally show that, if we enrich the informational environment and use, for example, approval balloting instead of single-vote balloting, our May-style argument for plurality rule can be turned into a May-style argument for approval voting as de…ned by Fishburn (1978, 1983) . Although we state this result primarily to show that our main theorem depends on the given informational environment, our
May-style characterization of approval voting can also be seen as a novel result in its own right. (For other characterizations of approval voting, see Fishburn, 1978 , and Sertel, 1988 In the formal framework introduced above, we now assume that each individual votes not only for a single option or abstains, but votes for all those options he or she approves of (which may be any number of options between 0 and k). However, if anonymity is strengthened subtly, then we obtain a May-style theorem on approval voting.
Optionwise anonymity. Let be any permutation of the votes cast for some option j (holding …xed the votes cast for other options), represented by a permutation of the entries in row j in a pro…le (holding …xed all other rows). For any pro…le v,
Optionwise anonymity is the separate application of May's original anonymity condition to each option; it prevents di¤erential treatment of an individual's votes on some option depending on his or her votes on other options. Informally, we can describe the di¤erence between anonymity and optionwise anonymity as follows.
Anonymity is compatible with a procedure whereby each individual submits a single anonymous ballot paper on which he or she indicates which options he or she approves of and which not. These ballot papers are then put into a ballot box and shu-ed. Yet, although all information about the voters'identity is eliminated, it is still possible to associate anonymous voters with combinations of approved options; it is possible to see, for example, that one voter has voted for options 1, 3 and 5, a second for options 2 and 3, a third for option 4 alone, and so on. Optionwise anonymity, by contrast, requires a procedure whereby each individual submits a separate ballot paper for each option, indicating approval or disapproval of that option. These ballot papers are then put into separate ballot boxes, one ballot box for each option, and shu-ed inside these separate boxes. This eliminates not only all information about the voters' identity, but also all information about combinations of approved options for each anonymous voter. Under single-vote balloting, where each voter can only vote for one option, anonymity and optionwise anonymity are equivalent, but, under approval balloting, the two conditions come apart, and optionwise anonymity is stronger than anonymity simpliciter.
Now a straightforward adjustment of our proof above leads to the following result.
Theorem 2. Under approval balloting, an aggregation procedure satis…es universal domain, optionwise anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness if and only if it is approval voting.
The use of optionwise anonymity in this May-style characterization of approval voting is consistent with a slogan that Brams and Fishburn (1983, p. 12) 
Concluding remarks
Democratic theorists defend the use of "majority rule,"often without saying precisely which of a large range of broadly majoritarian voting procedures they mean (Spitz, 1984) . Moreover, when giving May's theorem pride of place in their arguments for majority rule, they often gloss over the theorem's restriction to pairwise decisions.
In the real world, "our standard voting system ... is ... the plurality vote, where a voter votes for his favorite candidate and the candidate with the most votes wins" (Saari, 2006) . Yet, of all the broadly majoritarian voting procedures that have been proposed in theory or are used in practice, plurality rule is perhaps the one that is held in lowest esteem by theorists of democracy. As we have noted, plurality rule is criticized in particular for focusing solely on voters'revealed "…rst choices" and not taking into account their full preferences.
However, just as the most commonly used aggregation procedure in the real world is plurality rule, so the most commonly used balloting procedure is single-vote balloting. Surprisingly, it has never been noticed before that, under single-vote balloting,
plurality rule is what May's theorem, in a simple generalization to decisions over many options, supports.
There may be other, more practical things to be said for plurality rule in conjunc- 
